Emergencies

Handling Emergencies - Perspective from Big Ships' Practices

Administrator — Tue, 01 May 2018 20:42:00 +0000

Handling Emergencies - Perspective from Big Ships' Practices

Mark Lenci

Administrator Tue, 05/01/2018 - 20:42

Emergencies

Handling Emergencies – The Captain’s Perspective

Big Ships’ Practices Aboard Yachts

by Mark Lenci, Captain USN (retired), Boston Station

About the author: Mark Lenci’s 26-year Navy career included serving on five nuclear attack submarines and the US Seventh Fleet command ship. He commanded USS Houston (SSN 713). Mark and his wife Bev have cruised their 52-foot sailboat, Sunflower, over 22,000 miles in the last 10 years in Maine, the Canadian Maritimes, and Newfoundland. They also spent two seasons cruising Boston to Duluth, MN and back via the St Lawrence Seaway. Mark will be entering his boat in the 2018 Newport Bermuda Race.

Background

Navy and large commercial vessels have, over centuries, developed effective techniques for handling emergencies. A sailor from Nelson’s Navy would initially be baffled by today’s ships, but he would immediately understand what was happening during today’s equivalent of “beating to quarters” (going to general quarters to handle an emergency).

This article suggests how the principles of handling emergencies on large ship can be applied to smaller private yachts – yachts capable of being cruised comfortably by two people. The principles can be easily extended to crews of more than two people, larger yachts, and professionally crewed vessels.

This article is it is written specifically for the captain, and in larger crews, for her/his watch captains and second in command. It intentionally does not address specific damage control equipment; individual damage control skills of crewmembers, vessel preparation to withstand and minimize damage, or actions to prevent emergencies

Principles of Damage Control

Organization:
- A “control station” to operate the boat and direct damage control effort.
- A “damage control party” of one or more people that go to the location of the problem, fix the problem, and stabilize the location.
Initial Action:
- Alert all hands
- Put the boat into a stable configuration which is basically the same for all emergencies. Stop any unnecessary evolutions.
- Establish the most reliable methods of propulsion and steering
- “Damage control party” goes to the location of the emergency.
Follow-up Action:
- Stop the casualty (i.e., put out the fire, stop the flooding, etc.)
- Stand down from all hands emergency response.
- Make provisions to operate the boat with degraded capability and restore the boat to full capability when possible.

Organization

There are two major parts of a yacht’s organization for emergencies.

On US Navy vessels, Damage Control (DC) Central coordinates damage control efforts and communicates status and recommendations to the control station. Damage control parties at the location(s) of the emergency communicate with DC central. Due to a yacht’s relatively small size and limited crew, these damage control activities are most likely concentrated in a single location and performed by one or a few crewmembers. Therefore, I will refer to this part of the yacht’s emergency organization as the “Damage Control Party”.

The second major part of a yacht’s emergency organization is the control station. The control station controls the yacht, provides overall coordination actions during the emergency, and directs any external communication. I will refer to this part of yacht’s emergency organization as the “Control Station”.

It is vitally important that the captain understand the roles and responsibilities of the two parts of the yacht’s emergency organization – the Control Station and the Damage Control Party - and time-share her/his efforts between them as appropriate for the specific emergency, for that particular crew, and the yacht. The remainder of this article suggests considerations, methods, tips, and lessons learned for a captain to establish the yacht’s emergency organization and combat emergencies.

“Control Station”

With a crew of just two people, the captain may choose to be in cockpit or on the bridge of powerboat and thus perform the functions of the control station herself/himself. This decision should be based on the captain’s assessment of the skills of the other crewmember. With a larger crew, crewmembers can be assigned roles and the Captain can step back to keep the bigger picture. In any case, the captain must avoid getting involved completely in one of the functions to the detriment of the other.

Focusing on just one function can lead to additional problems such as collision or running aground

Focusing on just one function can lead to additional problems such as collision or running aground while focusing on solely on the Damage Control Party actions; or not controlling the boat and its equipment to facilitate fighting the emergency while focusing purely on the control of the yacht. In a two-person crew, the single person at the control station is performing the functions of controlling the vessel, overall coordination of emergency actions and external communications. That person must consciously divide their time between the functions as the situation dictates. For example, if it is calm weather with no other vessels in sight and a stable propulsion configuration, more time can be spent on the coordination function. It is very easy to slip into focusing on just one function. By recognizing that there are distinct functions that must be performed, the person in the control station will avoid getting involved completely in one of the functions to the detriment of the others.

If the vessel has more than two crewmembers, the captain can decide to use one person for ship’s control while he/she shares time between performing the DC Central function and monitoring person in the ship control function.

TIP: At night it is helpful to set up the damage control party below decks where there is presumably better light and more room.

With an even larger crew, the captain can establish one or more people for ship’s control and one or more people for the DC party. The captain may choose to stay in the cockpit with the helmsman (control station) and send another person as the DC party leader to main cabin where he/she could stage damage control gear, direct aid to injured personnel, coordinate damage control efforts, etc. If the captain is able to delegate both the control station and DC party leaders, the situation is ideal because the captain can stay “above the fray” and think two or three steps ahead.

Tip: My guidance to my officers of the deck and to officers in charge at the location of an emergency was that if they could keep their hands in their pockets, they were probably staying above the fray, directing others, and thinking ahead. The captain should always be asking herself/himself during an emergency: “What comes next? What comes after that?”

If the captain starts to do damage control himself or herself – which may be required and appropriate on a yacht - he/she needs to recognize that the role of the captain is degraded. Doing damage control herself/himself is logical for a captain because often the captain is the owner and most knowledgeable person about the boat. There may be no alternative with a crew of two, and if that is the case, the captain should recognize the risks involved in she/he having “hands on” involvement in damage control efforts and compensate for this. For example, he/she may want to slow down, heave to, put the boat on autopilot, drop anchor, etc. to reduce the complexity of the situation while damage control is in progress.

The Damage Control Party

The DC party is the crewmember(s) that go to the location of the emergency.

In large crews, the DC party will have (a) a team leader, (b) a person designated for communications of the DC party to/from the control station, and (c) crew members fighting the emergency (e.g. using the fire extinguisher, stopping the flooding, etc.). For a two-person crew, the DC party functions are all combined in the single crew member. Regardless of size, it is important to remember there are three roles in the DC party so that all three functions happen even if the DC party is only one person.

I recommend that a vessel have a “default” plan designed for its minimum crew – two people. The captain should decide IN ADVANCE whether she/he will go to the location of the emergency and be the DC party, or if she/he will go to the control station to perform or supervise the control station function. My personal opinion is that either way works depending on the experience, skill, and physical condition of the crew. When the emergency actually occurs, if the crew is sufficiently experienced and trained, the captain can switch roles if she/he decides that would work better in that specific situation. The key point is that there must be a default plan that everyone understands and executes initially when the emergency first occurs. You can adapt the plan as the situation warrants but you must have a plan to start with.

If the crew has three or more people, I recommend that the default plan be that the captain goes to the control station initially (cockpit or bridge) and the second most experienced crewmember goes to the location of the emergency to perform the function of DC party leader (and other DC party roles if needed).

If a crew has two or more watch sections, using the concept of watch section roles for the yacht’s emergency organization works nicely. For example, if a vessel has two watch sections, the on-watch section would take the ship’s control role and the off-watch section would be the DC party. The watch captain of the off-going watch takes the role of the DC party leader. If there are three watch sections, the on-coming watch section musters in the cockpit or bridge and can be assigned as needed to supplement either the DC party and the bridge/cockpit team. Using the watch team concept for the DC party works better than assigning roles to individuals by name. If an individual is assigned to a role by name, she/he may be on-watch when the emergency occurs which in turn may require a watch relief in the middle of an emergency in order for them to perform their role.

Summary:
There are innumerable permutations of crew, boat, and casualties but the roles of the DC party and control station are always the same. By understanding the functions of the DC party and the control station, the captain can allot the proper resources to these two parts of the yacht’s emergency organization so that both happen in a manner that fits the situation.

Categories Of Emergencies

It may seem that there are an overwhelming number of possible emergencies and ways to respond. I suggest that the emergencies we are most likely to experience on yachts fall into one of three categories. Each of the three types of emergencies has a different initial response:

Fire
Collision/Flooding (includes grounding)
All other emergencies (includes man overboard)

These categories are a consolidation of the categories used by military and civilian ships. Characterizing emergencies into only three categories is very helpful in training the crew and responding to emergencies.

Fire: This category is listed first intentionally. I consider fire the greatest danger at sea. It is most likely to kill or seriously injure a crew member, has the potential for the greatest damage and possible loss of the vessel, and requires the fastest response. The actions to fight this casualty are distinctly different and use different DC equipment compared to the next casualty.

Flooding: The choice of the name for this emergency is important. I recommend the use of the specific word – “flooding”. Every crew should discuss the difference between “flooding” and a “leak”. The response is dramatically different. A “leak” is within the capacity of bilge pumps and gets handled on a priority basis. It is not an all hands emergency. “Flooding” is an all hands emergency. The difference is simple – If the person reporting the emergency feels their life or the safety of the vessel is threatened, it is flooding. A more precise definition is not needed but a discussion with the crew during training is useful. For example, "If the water is at the deck plates …" or "If you are standing in water …" would be examples of water that threatens the safety of the boat so it would be flooding. If in doubt, it’s flooding.

The initial actions for collision and grounding start with basically the same response as flooding so they fall under this emergency.

All other emergencies: Whereas flooding and fire are an immediate and grave threat to the safety of the vessel and entire crew, emergencies in this category also require an all hands immediate response but are may not be as severe a threat to the safety of the vessel and entire crew. Examples are man overboard, major damage to sails and rigging, medical emergency, rescue and assistance to other vessels, steering or propulsion casualties in restricted water, etc. The category is “open” in that there is not a limited, pre-defined list. The captain can use this response for any emergency requiring an urgent, all hands response with maximum flexibility in how to employ the crew.

Initial Actions

Tip: The captain should emphasize in every training session the importance of first notifying the control station before any other action. A person’s first urge is to combat the emergency rather than notify the control station

The two goals of the initial actions are to (1) alert the control station of the emergency and then (2) put the boat into a pre-determined, known configuration. Each word is significant so let’s examine that sentence.

Absolutely first and foremost is that the person discovering the emergency alert the control station. The person should not attempt to combat the emergency until after alerting the control station. This must be drilled into every person onboard.

Why notify first and then fight the emergency? This lesson is written in blood, literally. If the person discovering the emergency attempts to fight the emergency before notifying the control station, all too often the emergency gets out of control for one person and because the control station was not notified, the vessel’s response is delayed. Another tragedy is the person fighting the emergency single handed is overcome and becomes a casualty.

Why notify the control station? It is the one place that can be counted on to have a person awake and on watch at all times. So that is the station that by default must be notified.

TIP: We mounted two small air horns (about 4 inches high – available at any party supply store) with Velcro in the cockpit and the salon that can be used to sound the alarm for any emergency.

Once the control station has been notified, the control station must “call away” the emergency. With a two-person crew, the control station may be the person discovering the emergency and he/she must insure the other crewmember is notified if they are not already up. With a larger crew, a crewmember should be sent to physically notify all crewmembers and visually inspect all bunks to insure all people are up. It is critical that an inspection of all berthing be done, particularly in the case of a fire. You don’t know where people may be sleeping and failure to awaken them may result in them being overcome by smoke in their sleep. The person performing the role of the DC party leader is responsible for insuring all hands are awake and responding.

The next step is to put the boat and its systems into a planned, baseline configuration for fighting the casualty. The exact way the boat should be operated in an emergency depends on the type boat and its specific equipment. In general, two principles should be followed. First, secure any unnecessary evolutions. For example, if a generator set is running, secure it.

Tip: Slow down the problem. Slowing the boat down will likely make many things easier – less wind across the deck, less heel, less strain on rigging, less demand on the helm, etc. But don’t slow down to the point of being a hazard to other vessels or losing steerageway.

This is one less source of water for flooding, one less source of electricity in a fire, and in general one less thing going on that can complicate damage control. If galley equipment is being used, secure it. Shut off the propane supply. Other examples of unnecessary evolutions are changing sail configurations, pumping holding tanks, doing routine maintenance, etc.

TIP: It is a worthwhile team building training session to sit down with crew and brainstorm what would be the best way to configure the boat for fire and for flooding in the conditions anticipated during the current voyage.

The second part of establishing a known baseline configuration is to establish the most reliable mode of propulsion and steering. For the two-man crew, this may mean leaving the sails untouched and putting the boat on autopilot. With a larger crew the captain may direct a manual helm and reducing sail/changing course to give a smoother ride in order to make damage control efforts easier. The goal is to get the boat to a configuration that makes it easiest to maneuver and with no unneeded things going on. What condition this exactly is will depend on the boat and the situation, but it is helpful to think through possible scenarios in advance and have a general plan in mind.

Follow Up Actions

Stop the casualty

The purpose of this article is to describe high level considerations for handling emergencies. Therefore, this section contains general guidance applicable to all vessels and does not get into specifics such as techniques to stop flooding.

The need for speed: FIRE is the only emergency where speed of response is always a life or death matter. A yacht is not equipped with personal protective gear for firefighting and air breathing apparatus as a large ship would be. The yacht also does not have equipment to remove smoke from below decks. Therefore, if a fire on a yacht is not extinguished very rapidly, likely the area below decks will become uninhabitable due to smoke and heat - thus stopping effective firefighting efforts. If a fire gets to that point, the crew must abandon ship and the yacht is likely lost. If anyone is overcome by smoke or otherwise trapped below decks, they will die. This is why I consider fire the most dangerous emergency at sea.

Fire:

The general steps are to determine the location and source of the fire, eliminate the source if possible, put out the flames, remove the smoke from the vessel, and “overhaul” the fire.

Except for a fire on the galley stove, the location and source of fire aboard a vessel is rarely immediately obvious. The more complex the vessel, the more likely it is that the source of a fire is an electrical component. Major electrical components are seldom in plain view. Electrical fires often produce light smoke – light in color and light density. Cooling fans and ventilation fans may move the smoke some distance from its source. Finding the exact location and source of the fire will likely require opening panels and other means of gaining access to components. Once access is gained to the general area of the fire, there will likely be multiple components in the space. There are only a few places on a cruising yacht where major electrical components can be located so these spaces often have several major components and a mass of wiring. If the space is filled with smoke, it may be challenging to determine exactly what is burning.

TIP: It is very helpful to place labels with large letters on major electrical components. This helps crew members rapidly identify equipment for routine operations and in emergencies. Labeling key valves is also a good idea. Valve labels can either be on the hull or frames near the valves, or on tags attached to the valves.

In the discussion about the DC party, I stated as a default the captain goes to the control station and the second most experienced person goes to the location of the emergency. The situation described above illustrates the utility of the second most experienced person going to the location. It will likely take an experienced person with some specific knowledge of that vessel to find the source of a fire, particularly an electrical fire.

With a small crew, if the source of the fire is not quickly identified, the captain – who is likely the owner – may consider having the DC party leader come to the control station to take charge there while the captain takes over at the location to find the source of the fire.

If the source of the fire is electrical, the odds are good that the fire cannot be completely extinguished until electrical power to the damaged component is shut off. Additionally, it would be dangerous to remove the cover of a major electrical component to get to the burning interior unless the power was removed from the component. The captain should decide whether she/he wishes to retain control of the decision to manipulate the electrical system and components; or whether she/he is willing to delegate that control the DC party leader. If the DC party leader has sufficient knowledge of that vessel, it may be advantageous to delegate the authority to manipulate the electrical system to the DC party leader (open breakers, turn off equipment, etc.). The DC party leader is most likely physically closer to the electrical control panels and the location of the fire.

If the burning component is an AC component, it is usually relatively easy to deenergize it. Normally AC power only comes from an inverter, a generator, or shore power. The AC distribution system usually has breakers for all components and outlets. Therefore, opening (shut off) all AC breakers should deenergize the burning AC component. All vital navigation and many other pieces of equipment needed to handling sails, ground tackle, steering, etc. on cruising yachts are DC powered so securing AC power will likely not degrade the ability to operate the vessel. Therefore, there should be little risk in turning off all AC power.

If the burning component is a DC component or has both AC and DC power (i.e. inverters and battery chargers), the option to shut off all DC power has more significant implications because shutting off all DC power could seriously degrade the boat’s capabilities since most navigation, communication, vessel control systems, and pumps are DC powered. The first step should be to open the appropriate breakers. If power to the burning component cannot be shut off by opening breakers on the electrical distribution panel, the captain may make the decision to open the battery disconnects for the house battery bank(s) and/or other battery banks (starting batteries, bow thruster/windlass batteries, etc.). Remember that when a diesel engine is running (propulsion or generator), this is also a source of DC power and should also be shut off. On some electrical systems, disconnecting the battery while diesel engine is running may damage the alternator on that engine. I suggest that disconnecting the batteries is a decision the captain should have the opportunity to concur with due to the impact on the capability of the vessel.

TIP: The most inexpensive portable fire extinguishers are dry chemical fire extinguishers. This type of extinguisher is often the only type of portable fire extinguishers found on cruising yachts. The dry chemical in these extinguishers is extremely corrosive. If a fire is in an electrical panel, the use of the dry chemical on the panel can result in corrosion problems inside wires, in connectors, and in other components for years to come. Consider having a Halotron or CO2 extinguisher onboard for use in electrical fire. These types of extinguishers are considerably more expensive than dry chemical extinguishers but are cheaper than replacing a major section of the electrical

Once a burning electrical component is deenergized, the class C fire is now a simple Class A fire and can be extinguished.

When the fire is out, the DC party leader should report “The fire is out” to the control station. This is obviously a key status report. The DC party shifts to removing smoke from the boat and inspecting to insure the fire is completely out. Good lighting is required to do this. The process of exposing interior areas of components, compartments, cushions, behind panels, behind the overhead panels, etc. is called “overhauling” a fire. This process insures the fire is not still smoldering in areas you cannot see. It is important that the fire be overhauled before the vessel stands down from the emergency.

If the fire had spread and was extensive, the captain should consider stationing a “re-flash watch” for some period after the fire is out.

TIP: Have both a diagram and list of all hull openings below the waterline posted. The list should have very large font for ease of use. The source of the flooding may not be obvious. The DC party members may have to go down the list of hull openings methodically to find the source.

TIP: It is important to determine if the water is salt water or fresh water. Although it may sound silly, the “taste test” is the simple means for doing this.

Flooding: The goal of the response to flooding is to stop the flooding or reduce it to a leak. Again, I emphasize the importance of training the crew on the use of the words “flooding” and “leak”. Flooding is a life and vessel threating, all hands emergency. A leak becomes an operational annoyance and a maintenance issue.

If an engine is running (propulsion or generator), there’s a good chance the flooding is from a hose or fitting associated with the engine. On powerboats, statistics show that if an engine is operating, it is almost certainly the source of the flooding.

The key report in this phase for flooding is “The flooding is stopped”. The DC party then dewaters the boat.

TIP: When aiding another vessel, the same organization and process will apply. Using the emergency organization, equipment, and processes that are used aboard one’s own vessel will immediately organize the crew’s response to the same emergency aboard another vessel.

The key report in this phase for flooding is “The flooding is stopped”. The DC party then dewaters the boat.

All other emergencies: Other emergencies may also require an all hands immediate response but may not be as severe a threat to the safety of the vessel and entire crew. Examples are man overboard, major damage to sails and rigging, rescue and assistance to other vessels, steering casualties in restricted water, etc. The category is very broad. The captain can use this response for any emergency requiring an urgent, all hands response with maximum flexibility in how to employ the crew.

Stand down from “general emergency”

The captain makes the decision on when to stand down from an emergency. It is important that this be a formal decision by the captain (often at the recommendation of the DC party leader). It should be announced to all hands. “Secure from firefighting” or something like that for other emergencies. The most important effects of the captain making this announcement to the crew is the calming effect it has and building of confidence. A confident sounding announcement by the captain to the effect that “We are OK” and her/his general intentions on how they will proceed will give the crew an enormous boost in morale as the adrenalin ebbs.

The yacht stands down from an emergency as soon as it is safe to do so. In the case of fire, the fire must be out and have been overhauled. In the case of flooding, the flooding must have been stopped (or reduced to a leak) and the bilges dewatered. For other emergencies, stand down when all hands are no longer needed.

A crew cannot stay at “general quarters” indefinitely. No one would sleep or eat. It is important to get the normal watch section back on watch and the on-coming watch section into bed in preparation for their next watch. The captain can consider modifying the watch bill so that one or more people no longer stand watch and can be dedicated to the repair work.

If equipment has been damaged, the captain should establish temporary operating procedures that address how the vessel will be operated until it is restored to its full capability.

Restore the vessel to full capability

TIP: If equipment has been damaged, the captain should establish temporary operating procedures and/or standing orders that address how the vessel will be operated until it is restored to its full capability.

TIP: The captain can consider modifying the watch bill if the vessel has sufficient crewmembers so that one or more people no longer stand watch and can be dedicated to the repair work.

The captain should make the call on how much crew effort will be devoted to repair work based on the nature of the damage and the yacht’s situation. For example, if the yacht is a short time from harbor or anchoring perhaps the repair efforts can be delayed until the yacht is no longer underway. A storm at sea may preclude any meaningful repair efforts until the vessel is more stable. If repair parts or assistance ashore may be required, the repair effort may be a priority to assess the damage and determine what parts and assistance are needed so that this can be communicated to shore.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CAPTAIN

Tip: In my experience, it doesn’t matter so much what the plan is, as long as the captain communicates a plan.

Project confidence: What does that mean in the practice? It does NOT mean the captain has no fear or acts like a stalwart character in a movie. In my experience, the key ingredients for projecting confidence in an emergency are (a) communicate the plan frequently and (b) show confidence in the crew. A seasoned captain may have a detailed plan for emergencies that the crew has trained on. In an unusual situation or with a less experienced captain and/or crew the plan may be as simple as stating what is being done at the moment. By communicating the plan to the crew, the captain enables each crew member to understand the plan, figure out what they can best do to support the plan, and hopefully speak up with any problems or suggestions they have about the plan. Many minds will always do better than one mind. Conversely if the captain does not communicate a plan, crewmembers fearing for the safety of the vessel will all develop their own plans and the situation will devolve into chaos.

Tip: Direct a crew member to record key information such as time, major actions, etc. After the emergency is over, it is hard to remember what actually happened and when.

The captain must also demonstrate she/he has confidence in the crew. An emergency is not the time to start yelling at or criticizing crewmember’s actions. Even if the captain directs crewmembers to do things they have never done before, he should show confidence in their ability to do the task. This will both inspire the crewmember and give others confidence in that crew member.

Think two steps ahead: The captain must make every effort to think at least two steps ahead. Likely no one else is doing that. The crew is focused on their immediate and specific actions for the emergency. It is essential that the captain force herself/himself to step back, let the crew carry out the actions that have been directed, and think ahead. She/he should be asking herself/himself questions like: “What else can we do now?” “Is every person onboard accounted for and being used effectively?” “Do we need to call for help?” “When the emergency is over, what will we need to do?” “Are we in danger of losing the vessel and if so, at what point do we stop DC efforts and abandon ship?” “What if we have to abandon ship?” If the captain gets “hands on” involved in handling the emergency, she/he can no longer effectively perform this critical function. This may be necessary if the captain is the only one with the knowledge or experience required to handle the DC effort. However, in this case, the captain must pass the responsibility for stepping back and looking two steps ahead to the second in command. (see next section)

Training the Crew

(How to start implementing the concepts of this article)

Insuring the crew is properly trained is the captain’s responsibility. This does not mean the captain must personally conduct all the training. However, the captain must decide what level of training is required for each crew member individually, what level of training is required for the crew as a team, set the standards for training, and insure the training is conducted as needed.

It is helpful to think of training in two categories:

Personal (individual) qualification and training
Crew (team) training

Personal Qualification and Training:

Personal qualification and training are the building blocks for crew training. Crew training will be less than successful if individual crew members do not have the requisite personal skills. For example, crew training on firefighting will fail if crew members do not know the location of firefighting equipment or do not know which type of fire extinguisher to use or how to use it.

TIP: A good way to track crewmember qualification and organize their learning is the “personal qualification card.” This is a simple checklist of individual skills and practical exercises. The card can be purely for damage control or it can be expanded to include other skills. We regularly sail on longer trips with friends and family that have little boating experience. We have developed a qualification card that makes it fun for them to train on skills and participate in evolutions that both increase their enjoyment of the cruise and make them more capable crewmembers. The first section of this qualification card is the personal skills they need in event of an emergency (where to go in an emergency, location of DC and other emergency equipment, use of PFD’s, etc.). We award a guest crewmember a monogrammed boat’s hat or T-shirt when they complete a sufficient portion of the qualification card. The card also has advanced skills if they wish to go further. The card makes a nice souvenir for them when they leave.

The good news is that much of the required individual training is not unique to a specific vessel. Individual crew members can get this training in many ways and the crew does not need to be together as a team to get individual training. For example, individual damage control skills such as the proper use of fire extinguishers or techniques to stop flooding are taught in Safety at Sea courses by conducted by various organizations. First aid and CPR courses are readily available. The captain will need to determine what individual skills are required and which crewmembers need those skills. The ideal but seldom achieved situation is all crewmembers trained on all required individual skills. This gives the most flexibility in the boat’s organization.

Crew (team) Training:

Most vessels are familiar with man overboard training and this training is often taught in formal training courses and license programs. I suggest that additionally each vessel should do team training on fire and flooding emergencies.

A Navy ship likely conducts all hands drills at least two days a week. Yachts conduct team training much less frequently. Therefore, I recommend that a captain conduct team training on emergencies in several steps, each building and advancing from the previous step in order to get the most from the training.

First do a “walkthrough”. A walkthrough goes through all the actions required to handle an emergency at a slow pace with discussion during each step. This can be done at sea or almost as well at the pier or mooring. Typically, in a walkthrough the crew would be start from locations where they would typically be at sea (e.g., in the cockpit, salon, and in the bunk). The captain would then lead the crew through each step of the response to the emergency, pausing to discuss each step with the crew. Crew members can ask questions, practice their individual actions, locate equipment, etc. The crew often makes helpful suggestions that can improve the vessel’s response to an emergency.

Second, do a complete response without pausing. Then gather everyone together and have each crew member comment on the response. This insures everyone is engaged. Note that if the response goes badly wrong at some point in the practice, it is completely appropriate for the captain to stop the practice, critique the actions, do any additional individual skill training that may be required, and try the practice again. This is a better learning experience than continuing a practice that is going badly wrong.

Finally, the practice must be conducted while the vessel is underway in order to insure complete realism with the vessel in its normal operating configuration.

Training AFTER an actual emergency:

Some of the best training occurs after an actual emergency has occurred. As soon as practical after an emergency (so memories do not fade), a review session with all hands should be conducted. It should start with a review of the details of what happened so that all aspects of the are known to all hands. Have someone write down the details. Then review the crew’s actions. The captain should actively encourage full and open discussion. Do not shoot the messenger! Undoubtedly there are some things that could have been done better. Use this session to draw out the details, encourage discussion, and learn what to do better next time. Finally, write down a set of lessons learned and if appropriate, required follow up actions (such as getting additional DC equipment, additional training, etc.). Consider sharing significant lessons with other crews. This “after action” critique is a key element in the success of the US submarine force in peace and war.

The second in command:

I strongly recommend that the Captain designate a second in command. There are several advantages in doing this. The obvious one is that the captain may become incapacitated or simply exhausted. There will be no uncertainty as to who acts in her/his stead if the second in command is formally designated. Second, designating a second in command is an exceptionally good training opportunity. The captain should share his/her intentions, planning, and so forth with the second in command. Have the second in command lead a crew training session and emergency drill. This is a great opportunity to train the second in command and simultaneously demonstrate the captain’s confidence in the second in command to the rest of the crew. Third, designating and training the second in command adds flexibility and strength in emergency situations. For example, if the captain decides to she/he is best used at the location of the emergency (perhaps due to technical expertise, medical skill, knowledge of the vessel, etc.), the second in command would go to the control station. If the emergency is on a second vessel, the second in command is the logical choice to lead the assistance team if they are sent to the vessel in distress.

Non-watchstanders:

TIP: Put non-watchstanders to work during an emergency. They can be very helpful, and it will help maintain confidence. For example, they can keep a record of events. They can check each other’s life jackets. In restricted waters they can monitor & call out depth readings. With supervision, they can help with evolutions. Use imagination to find ways for them to contribute.

This category includes people onboard who do not stand watch. For example, friends and family members underway for a day trip or a multi-day voyage but with no boating experience. It could also be a regular crew member like a cook who does not normally stand watch. Consider the minimum essential training for a non-watchstander. Captains should have a short briefing for them on the minimum essential personal skills such as the location of personal flotation devices, how avoid falling overboard, etc. In a professional crew, non-watchstanders may have formal training in personal skills, e.g. STCW. After reading this article, it should be clear that non-watchstanders should also be trained on how and who to notify if they discover an emergency, what they should do (notify the control station and where to muster, don life jackets, etc.), and be introduced at a high level to the crew’s planned response to the three categories of emergencies.

Conclusions

Navy and large commercial vessels have, over the centuries and during untold hours of training and actual emergencies, developed effective techniques for handling emergencies. These techniques and the principles behind them can be adapted for yachts by understanding the differences in crew size, in crew skills, and in onboard emergency equipment.

The broad spectrum of emergencies that yachts are likely to experience can be reduced to three general categories: (1) fire, (2) flooding, and (3) all other emergencies. Thinking of emergencies in these three categories enables a captain to train his crew on a few standard crew responses that use the same organization for all of them. A captain can use the crew’s personal emergency skills and training as building blocks for crew training exercises.

From the perspective of the complete crew response to an emergency at sea, the key is to have a simple, standard organization and response plan. This enables a crew to start the response to an emergency from a planned, stable configuration of the yacht and with all people onboard acting with coordinated actions.

Disaster Averted

Administrator — Tue, 20 Jun 2017 18:56:15 +0000

Disaster Averted

Rich Feeley

Administrator Tue, 06/20/2017 - 18:56

Rigging

Emergencies

Editor’s note: An abridged version of this article was published in the February 2013 edition of the magazine Ocean Navigator. Rich Feeley has been kind enough to allow us to post his article on the Cruising Club of America’s Safety-at-Sea webpage.

There are really three great stories here: the first about saving the mast, the second about boat-to-boat transfers, and the third about the seamanship and preparation exhibited by the skipper and crew of Lora Ann. I learned a lot by reading every word!

DISASTER AVERTED by Frank “Rich” Feeley

THE VOYAGE

I always look forward to the return passage after the Newport Bermuda Race. It can be a pleasant cruise, usually well off the wind, without the constant pressure to make the last one hundredth of a knot or change sails at the first (or last) possible moment. For me it is a chance to catch up with old friends in the crew. Even the Gulf Stream might refrain from one of its malign moods.

Two experienced sailing friends from college years, Lee Reichart and Bill Rapf, joined me and Rich du Moulin (all age 65-67 but fit) to bring his Express 37, Lora Ann, back to New York. This crew had more than 50 Bermuda races plus return passages. Rich is a prime mover in Safety at Sea training, so we knew that Lora Ann would be well found and well prepared for the passage. In the exhilarating reach that was this year’s race, she finished third in her class to Carina, which won the St. David’s Lighthouse Trophy. Lora Ann has been on the podium for six straight Bermuda Races.

On Saturday, the day before our planned departure, the briefing room at the Royal Bermuda Yacht Club was packed for the presentation by the Bermuda Meteorological Service. The weather in Bermuda was benign, but the forecast showed two worrisome features. In the Gulf of Mexico, a developing low seemed destined to become a tropical storm, and perhaps a hurricane. A shower of computer projected tracks splayed out from its center. Most headed north to the Gulf Coast, but some crossed the Florida Peninsula and moved out into the Atlantic, crossing the homebound course late in the coming week. In fact, this low developed into tropical storm Debby and did follow the less probable track out into the Atlantic.

The other prominent feature was a strong cold front moving off the US coast. As it closed in on Bermuda in the daily projections, it squeezed the isobars against the amoeba shaped western extremity of the Bermuda High. If we left on Sunday, southwest winds would increase to 25 to 35 knots on Monday night as we intersected the front----conditions Lora Ann had encountered many times. It would be a bit bumpy on Monday night perhaps, but preferable to a delayed departure that might encounter a developing hurricane later in the week. The skipper’s subsequent conversations with a private weather routing service confirmed the projections, and we left St. George late on Sunday afternoon.

Two hundred miles out of Bermuda, as the wind was building, crew member Lee Reichart, a veteran of 20 years racing on Lora Ann and many Transatlantic and Bermuda races, slipped and fell against the primary jib winch on the port side. Once home, X-rays confirmed a broken rib on his left side. As we reached further away from Bermuda, Lee found it more and more difficult to move without severe pain, and by Tuesday as the seas built he was confined to his bunk, the pain buffered by Oxycodone and Valium. Rich had emailed his wife, Ann, a registered nurse, who advised us on the drugs. She also gave us the symptoms for a punctured lung which fortunately were not present.

As Lee’s condition worsened, so did the weather. Throughout Monday afternoon and evening, we shortened down from the Number Three jib to the Solent to reefed Solent, and from full main to one and then two reefs. By dusk on Monday night, we were sailing with only the double reefed main.

A small boat that does a lot of around the buoy racing, Lora Ann has a mainsail fitted with a boltrope and slot - no slides. Her reefs are secured by shackling each reef tack to a strop near the gooseneck rather than hooks that tend to release the sail as it is doused. But above the second reef the luff can blow away as the sail drops out of the slot. With one man down, and one having to steer in the big seas (the autopilot was struggling at that point), two crew would be hard pressed to control the mainsail when doused, so we deferred putting up the trysail.

However Lora Ann sails remarkably well with a double-reefed main alone, and we had been through 50 knots with this rig on many occasions so we did not change to the trysail. Lora Ann powered on into the night on a close reach at full speed. As forecast, the winds built above 30 knots. The seas were clearly building to impressive heights, and the self steering gear could not cope, so we steered by hand. We were almost glad we could not see the full height of the waves. One boarding sea threw the helmsman across the cockpit, but the two men on deck were safely strapped in and Lora Ann held her course. Rich has a strict policy of all crew tethered from the time one begins to ascend the ladder to the cockpit until back down below standing on the cabin sole. There is a big padeye near the companionway for this purpose.

THE DAMAGE

By dawn on Tuesday the seas appeared to be running 20 feet, with the wind holding the anemometer well up in the 30’s. Bill and I were on watch. As the grey light grew, there was a sharp crack, like a rifle shot. I looked up from my cockpit reverie to see the lower windward shroud flapping free, and the unsupported mast violently flexing from port to starboard about 1-2 feet at the first spreader. The shroud had broken off near the deck. I yelled “tack” and Bill immediately put the tiller down. Lora Ann promptly tacked to starboard, putting the load on the new windward side, taking the pressure off the port shrouds.

This tack brought us into the heart of a passing squall, sending the wind speed well up into the 40’s. For the moment, we were safe, but we were heading back for Bermuda. Could we keep the rig in the boat, repair it and return to our course for New York?

As shown in Picture #1, the port lower shroud turnbuckle threaded stud broke when the forged lower eye cracked. Fortunately the chainplate and barrel of the turnbuckle were undamaged. At the spreaders, the mast was bent 12 inches out of column but did not appear fractured or dimpled. Being so out of column, the compression of the rig and seas could bring down the mast any moment. The mast would have broken quickly if we hadn’t tacked, but it was still in danger of collapsing.

THE REPAIR

The first task was to reconnect the remainder of the shroud to the chainplate. Rich leaped on deck, and using a short piece of green Spectra line saved for damage control, fished the chainplate and stropped the turnbuckle back together (Picture #2). In order to tension the shroud, he secured a second (red) line to the turnbuckle, led it down through the chainplate, through a large block (also kept for emergencies) back to the primary winch (Picture 3). With this winch, we were able to tension the shroud and take up slack in the strop. Lora Ann now had all of her rigging, but we were unsure how much load it could take.

With a temporary repair in place, we reported our predicament to other boats during our planned morning SSB radio contact. All offered help. After considering the option of returning to Bermuda, potentially encountering tropical storm Debby en route, with Lee’s encouragement from his bunk, Rich decided to carry on for New York. We tacked back on to port, watching nervously as the load from the reefed mainsail came on to the repaired shroud. It held but we decided to motor until the seas subsided. With the mainsail down we were able to take a spinnaker halyard under the lower spreader and around the back of the mast to the port rail and winch it tight. The mast was now supported by the two lines to the turnbuckle and the halyard.

When the storm subsided the following morning, crew member Bill Rapf, sporting a helmet and PFD as a flak jacket, was hoisted to the lower spreaders to inspect for cracks (none) and attach a strong Spectra line to the babystay toggle fitting which we also led to the rail and aft to another winch. The babystay was perfectly located to support the lower shroud and bring the mast back into column (see photograph 4). We then unrigged the supporting halyard and hoisted the reefed main and Solent jib. Nervous but comfortable with our jury rig, we revised our plans to put as little pressure as possible on the mast. This meant carrying less sail area than optimal, and motorsailing when necessary. We carried extra jugs of fuel, but not enough to reach New York.

TWO PIT STOPS

Choucas was the nearest boat on our radio net, so arranged to meet us and transfer ten gallons of diesel on Tuesday evening. By the time we rendezvoused, a little before sunset, the wind was down but the seas still high. We motored cautiously under Choucas’ stern as they floated a line down to us. Once we snagged it, they released the other end attached to a five gallon jerry jug of diesel which floated easily. We pulled in the line and hoisted the jug aboard. We threw back the line and repeated the maneuver to obtain five more gallons of fuel. Choucas exhibited excellent seamanship and did not hesitate to come back four hours to help us.

It was clear that we could not maintain our original schedule of two man watches. Lee was confined to his bunk, and the skipper was navigating, doing damage control and maintaining constant communications links. Fortunately, Lora Ann has an excellent hydraulic self steering gear that does as well as a skilled helmsman in all but the highest seas. Bill and I shifted to one man watches, letting the autopilot steer. The man on deck maintained the look out and adjusted sails. As we gained more confidence in our jury rig, we added more sail, striving to maintain six knots plus with sail and power, but never pushing the boat to its normal performance. When we entered the Gulf Stream on Wednesday night, we shortened down to the storm jib in case we should encounter a Gulf Stream squall.

By Thursday, we were through the Stream and making nearly seven knots on a pleasant beam reach with just the Solent jib and double reefed main. Still, if the wind died, we would not have enough fuel to reach New York and get through the Harbor. Just before dusk, friends on the Tartan 47 Glory overhauled us and transferred an additional ten gallons of diesel fuel. In snagging the floating jerry can the telescoping aluminum boat hook parted but we were able to successfully complete the transfer.

Glory had internet access and was able to track Lora Ann on Yellowbrick for the three days after the shroud incident. When we broke the shroud they were 80 miles astern. Our Bermuda Race navigator John Storck, Jr in Huntington knew of our problem via email from Lora Ann, and visiting the Yellowbrick site, identified Glory as the boat behind us on our track. He emailed both Lora Ann and Glory, putting us in email and satphone touch with each other. Like many newer boats, Glory had no SSB. Thereafter they were kind enough to act as our “security blanket” and follow us until rendezvous 3 days later.

The reaching wind angle held through Thursday night, enabling us to maintain nearly seven knots with minimal pressure on the rig and no motoring. We raised the New York Harbor approach early on a steamy Friday afternoon, and were safely secured in New Rochelle before dinner, only a little more than five days out from Bermuda.

OTHER YACHTS

We later learned that Lora Ann was not the only yacht to suffer damage in that squally front. The C&C 41 Avenir lost her rudder at nearly the same time. Unable to steer or control the boat with a drogue or a spinnaker pole steering oar, the boat wallowed in the tumultuous seas. The crew eventually elected to abandon ship and was picked up by a passing cruise liner. Avenir was later recovered.

The well-sailed J-120 Mireille owned by Hewitt Gaynor is a regular competitor of Lora Ann in double handed races. She was about 40 miles to the east during the storm sailing under full mainsail (she is a much stiffer boat). In one squall she was knocked down beyond 90 degrees by a sea. Water from the boarding sea flooded out the navigation station. Mireille also hit some floating object and her retracted sprit was shoved aft through a bulkhead. Fortunately no one was hurt and our Black Seal rum on board was unharmed.

There were also serious injuries to crew members on the return passage in three other Bermuda competitors. Convictus Maximus sent a crew member with a spinal cord injury back to Bermuda on a merchant ship, while the US Coast Guard extracted injured crew members from Barleycorn and Conviction for medical treatment.

LESSONS LEARNED

Several lessons emerge from our experience and exchanges with others who had injuries or damage.

1. Preparations- Both crew and vessel need to be fully prepared for emergencies. On Lora Ann, two crew are safety-at-sea instructors, and a third had recently taken both the classroom and in-water safety courses. Lora Ann carries a spare rudder, an extensive damage control kit, drill and angle grinder,and power paks, and even 2x4s. Anticipate, anticipate! Consider possible disasters and carry the parts or items that can be used in a repair. Rich saved a short length of extremely strong spectra that some meticulous housekeepers might have sent off the boat to save weight. Not only did he have the right item, he knew right where it was and directed the crew to it immediately. The basic repairs were in place within a half hour of the accident

2. Inspections- Every year inspect all standing rigging and keep a log. Rich had replaced all the shrouds and turnbuckles three years ago, but was not sure if he had replaced the lower studs.

3. Communications- Plan regular radio or satphone contact with boats that will be near you. SSB is the best because all boats can hear each others’ reports, and chat for free as long as they wish. We also find that background noise like engines, wind and waves don’t interfere with hearing your radio speakers, but challenge your hearing on the satphone with its weaker speaker. Prior to departure, RIch had arranged a radio schedule with six boats, including Choucas, Mireille, and Next Boat. This enabled Next Boat to let the US Coast Guard know our situation while we worked on repairs. An hour later Rich talked with the Coast Guard and told them that our situation was stable and we would contact them if we needed assistance. The SSB net also enabled us to receive a fuel transfer from Choucas as soon as the seas had calmed. The Yellowbrick tracking device installed for the race made it possible for others ashore and at sea with Internet access to follow our track. Glory easily intercepted us for the second fuel transfer.

4. Sail Handling- When shorthanded, shorten sail earlier than seems necessary. The crew of Lora Ann did this through successive of jib changes and reefing. The weather forecast called for winds in the front that could be managed with the double reefed main, but at the upper end of the safe range. With one crewman injured, there were only three of us left to swarm down the main and get it lashed. By the time it was clear that the storm trysail was the better sail, it was dark, rough, and hand steering was required. So there were only two men left available to manhandle a flogging mainsail. In hindsight, we should have switched to the storm trysail before dusk on Monday, even though Lora Ann would have been underpowered for most of the night with the forecast winds. Instead of a double-reefed main, we could have had the trysail and either Solent or storm jib. That would have given us one more “step down” if we needed by dropping the headsail. For the return trip Rich stripped off the headfoil and used hanked jibs – an excellent seamanlike practice.

5. Mainsail Setup- Most large racing boats are rigged with luff slides , but many smaller boats like Lora Ann use boltropes and slotted masts.. Nevertheless, a “delivery main” could be made with slugs for the slotted track. At one time, serious ocean racing boats (particularly those built by Robert Derektor) had separate mast tracks on which a storm trysail could be “pre-loaded.” Once the main was down, and safely furled, the track would be switched and the trysail hoisted. A track starting from the deck removes the need to stand exposed on the cabin top in heavy seas. Any of these arrangements would make it easier to get a trysail up in the bad conditions when it is really needed.

Since our trip, Rich has sewn a grommet every two feet up the luff above the second reef. Thru the grommet is a small rope with a bowline. The bowline is snapped into a clip near the gooseneck as every two feet of boltrope comes out of the slot. Problem solved!

6. Crew Selection- Remember, just because the return passage is not a race, it is not a lark. In windy conditions on the return in 2008 and again this year, several sailors on other boats were injured when they were thrown around the boat. Lighter weight modern racing boats are faster, bouncier, and tougher on their crew. Those who are new to offshore sailing may not have the strength, balance or stomach for the rough ride that results. We were fortunate to have four experienced crew who could cope even when one was injured. If two or three of Lora Ann’s crew had been offshore “newbies.” the result might have been very different. Test all potential return crew in a rough environment closer to shore before signing them up for the return from Bermuda. Have them take seasick medicine before departing port. Experienced ocean crew should outnumber newbies.

7. Boat-Boat Transfers- In transferring fuel or other items at sea (even a person in a dinghy or raft), the leading yacht should tow a line astern for the receiving yacht to snag. A small cushion or PFD can help keep the end afloat. Then the receiving crew hauls in the heavy payload attached to the line. We did this the first time we received a fuel transfer from Choucas. The second transfer with Glory was more difficult. Glory towed the diesel jug astern, with cushions attached to assure that it would float high. It was easy to snag the line, but because it was stretched out to Glory, it was harder to pickup and required more careful positioning of the boats. Also, our telescoping aluminum boat hook pulled apart under the load. A one piece boathook would be better, but we recommend the first method of transfer- floating the line back and then pulling in the load.

Practice, forethought and determination – all building blocks of good seamanship- are pre-requisites for a successful voyage. Or as the late, great John Bonds said: prepare, adapt, prevail! We were fortunate to save the rig on Lora Ann and bring her safely home. Losing the rig in the big seas might have meant losing the boat. The Bermuda race organizers are currently surveying race participants about their experiences on the return voyage, and it is likely that an analytic report with important findings will be available later this year or next.

Picture 1 Bottom of turnbuckle on lower port shroud showing where the forging cracked.

Picture 2 The green line is a strop rigged immediately to connect the turnbuckle to the chain plate. The red line was also attached to the turnbuckle, then led aft to a winch to tension the repaired shroud.

Picture 3. The red line leading through the block flat on the deck tensions the shroud. The second red line leads to the mast at the spreaders and provides further support.

Picture 4 The mast, taken from behind. Shows the bend in the mast after we minimized the bend by leading a masthead halyard under the convex side of the bend and up to port, then winching the mast back into column. Note supplementary shroud (red line) that we led once seas had calmed.

Ed. Note. One of the reasons for the success of Lora Ann’s crew is the skipper, CCA member Rich DuMoulin. As Rich Feeley notes, Rich DuMoulin is one of the most thoughtful and organized people regarding Safety-at-Sea. He is especially focused on damage control. How many boats do you know which carry an entire separate rudder in case of steering system failure? This is not to belittle the work of all in the crew as they all demonstrated their experience, but DuMoulin’s extra forethought and preparedness helped make this incident a success.- RY

Safety at Sea is no Accident: Drills for Success

Administrator — Thu, 15 Jun 2017 18:19:48 +0000

Safety at Sea is no Accident: Drills for Success

Mark Roye

Administrator Thu, 06/15/2017 - 18:19

Emergencies

Practice

NO DRILL!: Safety at Sea is no Accident

By Mark Roye

Editor’s Note: This is one of the most powerful seamanship tales I have ever read, and I urge you all to read it through. It talks to having a high awareness of Safety Issues, and Preparing, and Practicing for emergencies, which in this case came. It is not often you get to learn about Abandon Ship and Life Raft practices from someone who has done it….TWICE!

Learn from the Best… Read On.

Part of what attracts many of us to cruising is that it is rather demanding. If we think that distant anchorages are often too crowded, imagine how it would be if getting there were easy! We bring to cruising skills that we have developed in a lifetime of professional work, hobbies, home repair projects, even our culinary adventures. But we are also compelled by our desire to sail to challenging destinations to advance our knowledge and master skills we know will be required, and which we know that we currently lack.

I was always enamored with boats, and wished nothing more than to spend a life following that love. But it was essential that the obsession finance itself. Not possessed of an innkeeper’s temperament, I knew that I was unsuited for charter work. Instead I turned to fisheries.

As the seasons passed, as my boats grew larger, so too did my skills. From self taught mechanical and engineering skills, to formal training in handling medical emergencies, helicopter evacuations, managing vessel stability, communications, fire fighting, retrieving crew overboard, survival suit and abandon ship procedures, my expertise grew with the training and miles beneath the keel. In addition, I became certified to train my crew and to hold monthly drills.

Some of this was driven by federal regulations, as well as by the instinct for self-preservation. The desire to succeed in my chosen profession played a good part as well. But most of all, experience simply left its mark. No career could possibly have prepared me better for cruising than the one I chose.

Twice I had to abandon ship to the life raft—in both cases in very cold water. I’d had to fight a fully involved fire a hundred miles offshore in the Bering Sea, quickly recover crew overboard in that same very cold water, retrieve an unconscious diver, resulting in CPR and air evacuation, handle flooding, and even made the helicopter trip once myself. I’ve had a number of friends undergo similar experiences. Some were injured, and some were lost.

All of those years of experience, through all sorts of conditions from the Gulf of Alaska to the Bering Sea, enabled Nancy and me to safely sail Tamara from the Arctic to the Antarctic and realize dreams we’d held for lifetimes. But those experiences also imbued me with yet another obsession—safety at sea.

I became convinced that training and drills are essential---essential even for those of us who have extensive experience, as there are always new techniques to master.

The first time I’d been forced to take to the life raft, I was alone aboard a small boat fishing salmon. I say “forced to take to the life raft”, as it had been drilled into us that one should never give up on the boat until it’s given up on you. Put another way, not to board the raft until you have to step up! The boat is always a better place than the raft, and only when she’s no longer by definition a boat---floating still qualifies—is it time to leave.

While the boat did a slow roll all the way over, I ran up the side like a Laser racer who’d been too hard on the mainsheet., but soon I was in the water, by myself, with the raft and survival suits still aboard.

Since the raft had no hydrostatic release, I had to swim in order to set it loose and pull the painter to inflate it. I was only in my thirties, very fit, and an excellent swimmer. But within minutes I was nearly incapacitated. I grabbed a survival suit as it floated by, crawled into the raft, and struggled to don the neoprene suit. The friction between the material of the suit and my wet clothing was so great that, in the effort to get the suit fully over my shoulders and zipped up, I pulled muscles in both of my shoulders.

The raft was appropriate for service in what was considered near shore waters. It had a full canopy, a single floor, virtually no water or rations, a few flares, and precious little else except the 121.5 MHz EPIRB that I had added. But I was aboard, and in my suit. Within a short time was able to kneel in the door and, by drawing one of the paddles directly toward me, slowly pull the raft closer to my ice chest, which was now drifting close by. In the ice chest was a six-pack of Canada Dry ginger ale, a one pound block of Tillamook sharp cheddar cheese, and a smoked turkey brest. I was elated, and felt like I could drift all the way to Japan if I had to.

It wasn’t long before the cold water sapped my elation. Even wearing the survival suit, the cold beneath the floor of the raft was numbing. My shivering brought me to the realization that I must keep my head. I opened the ice chest to get one of the cans of ginger ale, even though I wasn’t thirsty. I’d learned that even mild dehydration, particularly in time of stress, often leads to poor decision-making.

Taking the can from the ice chest gave me yet another idea---I could sit atop the red plastic box and get farther away from that cold water under the fabric of the raft. That yielded yet another possibility---it was easy to sit there, prop my elbow against my hip, and hold the EPIRB outside the raft to give its puny antenna a better chance before the battery failed.

After a night holding the EPIRB aloft, I was cold despite the suit and my seat. I now consider an inflatable double floor raft essential. Even tropical water is twenty or so degrees colder than your essential body temperature, and absolutely nothing is as effective at absorbing heat as water.

Finally the EPIRB attracted an airplane. As the plane drew near I let loose the last of my flares, and the pilot wagged his wings. An hour or so later a Coast Guard helicopter picked me up.

A few years went by, and by then I’d acquired a boat more than twice the size of the aluminum Bristol Bay salmon fishing boat that had dumped me into the drink. Along with my experience, additional training had made me even more safety conscious. Besides, now I had crewmembers for which I was responsible, and now our operations took us to far more dangerous waters, over a much longer season. Things were dangerous enough in mid-summer in sheltered waters, but now we worked offshore even in late winter.

Another thing had changed. The 1988 Federal Fishing Vessel Safety Act had mandated a very high standard for training and equipment. Lessons had been learned too often in the Bering Sea, and the industry, as well as the regulators, was taking note. Superb training programs were being founded, financed by the fleet itself, and materials were being developed regionally that eventually spread throughout the country. Our experiences became the model for training others.

Taking advantage of these offerings, I was quickly able to attain safety training certification equal to that of ships officers licensed for any ship in any ocean. Better yet, our training was not just for any ocean. We were trained specifically for the North Pacific and Bering Sea—50º and beyond.

Periodically I would take further training, or simply refresh what I’d done before. My crew participated as well, and back onboard we’d think through what our response would be in a given situation, then we’d walk through drills. In addition, at least once a month, we’d hold realistic drills, practice in the swimming pool, or even hold competitions with other boats.

fleet itself became the most powerful motivator for safety, and only fools complained about the regulations. Still, despite every effort, each season brought about the death of some of our friends. We were engaged in an inherently dangerous activity. But each season fewer were lost, and the effort to make the occupation safer continued. It continues still, with more easily accessible training, new techniques and equipment.

Ten more years went by. By then my boat was bigger yet, the specially designed, 91-foot Quin Delta. Our area of operations now covered thousands of miles, and the “season” included parts of all seasons, winter as well as summer. I was on watch as we were in transit from Bristol Bay in the Bering Sea to Prince William Sound off the Gulf of Alaska. The locus of the important annual salmon season was changing as the return of different species got underway, and we were on a one-week, 1,400-mile passage, being re-located by the seafood company for which we provided tendering services.

Our job would be to receive product from a fleet of salmon seine boats in the 46- to 58-foot size range fishing in fairly remote locations, quickly refrigerate that product, and transport it to processing plants. In turn we would provide fuel, groceries, water and other services to the smaller boats. As part of this, we carried 600 gallons of gasoline for aircraft and skiff engines.

From the generator air vent in the bulkhead of the bow compartment, some 60 feet forward of my comfortable chair in the wheelhouse, I could see wisps of smoke trailing aft. Before I’d even crossed the deck to investigate, flames were issuing from the vent--we were ablaze, a hundred miles from shore, far from help, with 600 gallons of gasoline just outside the compartment containing the fire. I closed and dogged the aluminum watertight door, then triggered the fire suppressant system in the compartment. But the engine failed to shut down, drawing the suppressant right out of the compartment. I ran back to the wheelhouse, and sounded the general alarm.

Ordinary fire extinguishers would be no help. We’d need the fire hoses with a protective spray pattern to even get close enough to use them, but the generator compartment was fully engulfed. Not only could we not get to the panel to switch on line the aft generator, it would do no good in any case, as the wire insulation was by now burned off. That would mean a fault direct to ground. All of our powerful electric pumps were useless.

The crew mustered to their stations. As hundreds of gallons of hydraulic fluid and lubricating oil, epoxy paint and other fuels fed the blaze, we took stock. It’s wouldn’t be long before the gasoline tank, secured just inches from the bulkhead of the forward generator compartment, would take the emergency from serious to critical. I decided we had no choice but to launch and board the raft, with the intent of remaining tethered to the Quin Delta by the lengthy raft painter. With luck, the specially designed tank filled with gasoline would perform as its design intended, the fuel would not explode but burn off, and we could then re-board and fight the fire. But I was not about to trust in luck, not here, not with other lives my responsibility. It was time to abandon ship

One crewman began throwing buoys and other floating objects overboard in order to create a visible debris trail—what we trained as making us “Bigger, Brighter, Different” from the surrounding sea. Two others gathered the survival suits, handheld radios, and abandon ship bag. I had previously broadcast a May Day call on the HF-SSB radio when I first sounded the general alarm, but now the fourth crewman brought down the large Furuno Locata EPIRB from atop the wheelhouse. This powerful beacon broadcast on both 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz, and included a bright strobe. We were assured of good communications.

We all donned the survival suits in less time than our drills, and launched the state of the art life raft. I’d learned from my prior raft experience---this one was the absolute best on the market, had a double insulated floor, enormous ballast pockets, was equipped with extra provisions, flares, parachute rockets and smoke signals, and was by all accounts the best in both design and construction.

The crew was well trained and knew their stations in the abandon ship procedure. Our training and equipment was the best. But like the flip of any coin, most rafts have an even chance of inflating upside down. We lost the coin toss. We were pros, and we knew how to re-invert the raft. Trouble was, we had to actually do it, and do it now. We weren’t in the pool---this was no drill!

Righting the raft was not something I was willing to delegate. I clipped the suit’s built-in tether to the raft painter and entered the water the way we’d been taught, protecting my head with one bent arm, the other out-stretched. Swimming to the raft, I grabbed the righting straps, stood on the CO2 bottle, and heaved backward. Nothing happened!

The rest of the crew, still onboard, lent a hand. As a team they hauled the raft close aboard, leaned over the rail, grabbed hold and lifted. The raft flipped as intended, but, predictably, it landed right on top of me. In the survival suit I was very buoyant. Now pressed up tight to the bottom of the raft as it filled with water ballast, I had to get out fast or drown. With a desperate grasp on a ballast pocket I hauled myself clear, and climbed aboard. The bigger of my crew followed, and then together we grabbed hold of the next two in turn to yard them effortlessly aboard.

Best laid plans….. As the boat drifted, the raft, still tethered, drifted alongside. Right alongside the burning gasoline tank! We’d have to cut loose. There’s supposed to be a blunt tipped knife secured at the door of these rafts for just this sort of situation, but no knife could be found. Nor was there a knife in the equipment bag---a crewman was already inventorying its contents as he’d been trained.

I had a knife in the pocket of my jeans, but with the survival suit on it wasn’t an easy matter getting to it. I’d learned not to un-zip the suit, so I wriggled my arm free of the neoprene sleeve, got my hand down into my pocket, then worked it up to the face flap of the suit. From there I could open the knife with my teeth, restore my arm to the sleeve of the suit, grasp the knife in the clumsy mitten of the suit, and cut the painter. In the process, I once again pulled all the muscles in my shoulder, just as I had years before. It was another object lesson. Do not take for granted anything having to do with your equipment!

As we drifted along with the boat we gained enough distance for safety, but not so much that the dramatic smoke and shooting flames wouldn’t serve as a beacon to our location.

I’d gotten off a clear May Day, and within a few hours a USCG high endurance C-130 Hercules aircraft hailed us by VHF. We answered with one of our hand held radios, and offered an orange smoke signal to aid his approach. The pilot politely declined, “No thank you. We can see the smoke and flame just fine from here.” Feeling silly, I simply thanked him for his professionalism.

It wasn’t long before another boat arrived. As the gasoline burned off (the tank had performed precisely as intended) they assisted us in re-boarding. There was only one piece of equipment aboard with which we could fight the fire, but it was the perfect piece.

Our drills had brought home the understanding that there may be an emergency situation that might render our numerous, powerful electric pumps helpless. This could have included rapid flooding that submerged the electric motors on the pumps, fire or some other event that disabled the electrical system, as happened to us, or flooding or fire on another boat which might require our assistance.

My crew had suggested that we put a portable pump and the necessary accessories in a high dock box, and secure the box in a safe place on deck. A 3” NPT Honda powered pump, two-handled nozzle, rigid suction hose, plenty of pressure hose, and a spare can of fuel were kept in the deck box. This equipment was used at each monthly drill not only for training, but also to assure that it was in good working order. Besides, it was great fun. We were the only boat in the harbor that could shoot high pressure water all the way across the turning basin between our dock and the next, and our drills provided much amusement as my crew would try to soak their friends. We had turned training into fun. Eventually competitions broke out that included not only “Hoser” contests, but also survival suit races, team boarding of rafts and other relevant events.

Now the event was real. With our pump, and later a smaller one dropped by the C-130, we began pouring thousands of gallons of seawater on the outside of the compartment. Immediately the fire subsided by half as the cascade carried heat away. Then we worked the once watertight companionways (the aluminum doors had not only melted, but burned away) and vents. Switching the nozzle’s spray pattern, we closed off those openings with a curtain of water, starving the fire of air.

Eventually we could enter the compartment, and finish off the fire. It had taken us nearly three hours, but we’d done it. We’d gotten great help from the boat that helped us re-board and from the second pump provided by the Coast Guard, but we’d extinguished that blaze by ourselves, as a team.

It took us another several hours to pump off all of the water that we’d pumped on to fight the fire, then twelve more to make our way a hundred miles to the very remote salmon cannery at Port Moller. It was a trying run, exhausted as we were, without electrical power to cook a hot meal, or clean up with showers.

No power meant that we had to take turns at the wheel all night, as the autopilot had no power for its electronics. Many boats of this sort do not fit alternators to the main propulsion engines, as they are a source of electronic noise, and, as a generator is usually on-line for other purposes, a sophisticated smart charger is better suited to long term battery charging. We had only limited emergency battery power for one VHF radio, an HF-SSB radio and a GPS. We couldn’t even power running lights. But we felt like champions. We’d done what we’d been trained to do. No one had been hurt. We’d saved our boat, and were going home the same way we’d come.

When the USCG investigators concluded their two-day on site incident review while we re-worked electrical panels so we’d have power, and waited for new fire extinguishers and life raft, the lead officer shook our hands and told us that we’d done everything right. Astonished, I asked him what he meant. He replied that even in the Coast Guard they teach their personnel to get out of the way of a gasoline fire, then firefight when it can be done prudently. He added that we’d worked well as a team, even the aircraft crews could see that from the air, our equipment was good, we knew how to use it, and that we’d kept our heads. We were gratified. In our universe this was high praise.

It was a long trip the rest of the way back to Cordova, then all the way to Seattle to the shipyard. We had lots of time to reflect on what we’d learned by our experience.

I learned never to take anything for granted---even something so small as the knife that should have been in the raft. We learned that all of the drills, the discussion sessions, the walk-thru practices had not only taught us our tasks, but had made us an effective team and given us confidence. Even though two of the crew were in their first season aboard, college kids working for the summer, they performed exactly as we’d drilled. None was the least bit frightened, even when we could hear explosions inside the burning compartment, even though all were fully aware of the gasoline stored just outside.

Most of all, we learned that there is absolutely no substitute for hands on training; getting wet in the pool, swimming around in survival suits, hosing down our friends with the fire pump, because when we had to do it for real, in the most difficult of circumstances, in the most dangerous of locations, it went every bit as well as it had when we’d just been having fun.

CCA Contact Mark Roye